ASYLUM REFORM PROPOSALS
Asylum Screening Centers Outside the US
Another asylum reform proposal would establish new centers outside the US where individuals could ask for an eligibility screening for asylum or refugee status before traveling here. Currently, no one can apply for asylum unless they are physically present inside the US border. Even refugees’ claims are not decided at US consulates but by the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) refugee officers (officers trained in refugee and asylum law) who interview them overseas, frequently in UN-hosted refugee camps. There are no official refugee processing centers in the Western Hemisphere, where most migrants who have asked for asylum at the border come from. The result is that people seeking protection must travel to the US to seek asylum. The Biden Administration opened Safe Mobility Offices in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Guatemala that functioned similarly to the proposed screening centers. They were run in cooperation with the host countries, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the International Organization for Migration. More than 266,000 cases were screened, resulting in 26,738 vetted and qualified refugees who resettled legally in the US. The second Trump Administration closed these offices when it declared an immigration emergency and cut off all asylum.
The Case ForÂ
Proponents of foreign asylum screening argue that it provides safety for migrants and deters dangerous journeys to the border, particularly for those with weak or invalid asylum claims. They suggest that screening centers can increase processing speed for qualified individuals, shortening the normal processing time for an asylum claim and allowing the individual to arrive in the US legally with refugee status and the authorized support that refugees receive to quickly integrate.
Some supporters also argue that screening centers abroad would significantly reduce many challenges the government faces at the border. These advocates note that the Biden Safe Mobility Offices allowed less than 10% of those processed to come to the US. They suggest that by expanding on that approach, we can significantly reduce attempts to cross the border illegally and the resources required to secure it. These proponents argue that our investments in the border wall, technology, and Border Patrol agents would go further toward keeping the border secure when they operate these external offices, deterring many who would enter the US with invalid claims. They argue it would also reduce the opportunities for cartels to smuggle and exploit immigrants for their own criminal enterprises.
The Case Against
Opponents argue against foreign screening centers from two different perspectives. Many immigration supporters argue that these offices decide cases too quickly, don’t provide access to legal counsel, and can exclude those who are most at risk, particularly if they must apply in the country they are seeking protection from. They argue that the less than 10% of those processed at the Biden Safe Mobility Offices allowed to come to the US indicates this approach is too restrictive on those who need protection from persecution.
Many immigration restrictionists have the opposite concerns. They believe these offices, like the Biden Safe Mobility Offices, would fast-track applicants into the US, bypassing standard border enforcement. They argue that many who were denied at the offices still came to the border. They also note the costs and difficulties of negotiating with host countries, as well as the expense of operating these offices. They also criticize the offices because they work with international organizations, arguing that it is “outsourcing” US immigration decisions, which are fundamentally the responsibility of our own government.